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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BEEHIVE STATE BANK,
a corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs. DEON ROSQUIST, GERALDINE,
ROSQUIST and ILA R. PAINTER,
Individuals, and CARPETS, INC.,
a corporation,
Defendants,
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N.A., a corporation,
Garnishee,
FRED L. PAINTER,
Intervener-Respondent
.
..

Case
No. 11053

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT-INTERVENER
NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment
granting a motion of the respondent intervener, Fred
L. Painter, for release of funds alleged to belong to him
and sought to be attached under a garnishment served
upon First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., as garnishee,
and directed against assets of the defendants in the
principal action, viz. Deon Rosquist, Geraldine Rosquist
and Ila R. Painter. Fred L. Painter was not a party to
the principal action.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Hearing was had in the lower court on the intervener's motion and the court entered its findings of fact,
1

conclusions of law and judgment in intervener's favor.
'I1he court found that the funds attempted to be garnished
were the property of Fred L. Painter, and ordered the
release of the garnishment and awarded intervener judgment against plaintiff for interest on the amount sought
to be garnished, also costs and attorney fees.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant asks for reversal of the judgment and an
order awarding appellant garnishee judgment for the
entire amount of a joint account standing in the names of
Fred L. Painter and Ila R. Painter on the books of the
garnishee, First Security Bank of Utah, N.A.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The relevant facts in this appeal are as follows:
Plaintiff had a judgment against the defendants
Deon Rosquist and Geraldine Rosquist, his wife, and
Ila R. Painter, wife of the intervener, based upon a contract for purchase of carpeting from the defendant Carpets Inc. allegedly signed by said defendants. (R. 8 and
R. 33-34) The contract had been guaranteed and assigned
by the defendant Carpets Inc. to plaintiff. The intervener was not a party to such contract or such judgment.
On February 3, 1964, plaintiff procured to be served
upon First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., a garnishment
issued under said judgment. (R. 35) The garnishee made
answer to the garnishment reciting that it had no assets
belonging to any of the judgment debtors, except as
follows: (R. 36)
"This bank had a joint deposit account in the
name of Fred L. Painter and Ila R. Painter at
the time of service of said writ, with a then bal2

ance of $723.79, and on which we are informed
some checks issued by Fred L. Painter were then
outstanding. On February 6, 1964, we were served
with written notice by said Fred L. Painter in
which he stated that funds deposited in said joint
account were his sole property and that he claims
the same as sole owner. On February 7, 1964, he
presented a check drawn by him against said
joint account for withdrawal of the full amount
remaining in said account, and demanded payment
of said amount to him. In the absence of proof
or knowledge to the contrary we assume that the
statement and claim of Fred L. Painter are correct. Said Fred L. Painter and Ila R. Painter are
also indebted to this bank on a note not yet due
in an amount greater than the amount of said
joint account at time of garnishment."
No traverse or reply to the garnishee's answer was
at any time filed by plaintiff nor did plaintiff at any
time offer evidence to rebut it. On April 9, 1964, plaintiff filed a motion for judgment against the garnishee
(R. 37) which motion was heard by the court on August
7, 1964 and the court made the following order as shown
by minutes of the court (R. 73)
"The motion is argued to the Court by respective counsel and submitted. Thereupon the
Court denies plaintiff's motion without prejudice."
The statement relating to this proceeding on Page 4
of Appellant's Brief, that:
"The court failed to enter a garnishee judgment but charged First Security Bank of Utah,
N.A., with a continuing obligation to appellant in
the sum of $723. 79"
is clearly contrary to the ruling of the court.
Plaintiff took no action at any time to implead Fred
L. Painter.
3

His wife, Ila died February 12, 1966. (R. 42) On
August 29, 1967, Fred filed his Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to Dismiss Garnishment. (H. 40-41) This
motion was supported by the following affidavit (R. 4243)

"Fred L. Painter, of Nephi, Utah, being first
duly sworn on oath deposes and says:
That he is the surviving husband of Ila H,.
Painter who was named as one of the defendants
in the above entitled action and who was also
named with this affiant as joint owner of a joint
tenancy deposit account at the First Security
Bank of Utah, N.A., Nephi Branch, which deposit
account is referred to in the answer of said bank
to a writ of garnishment issued in the above entitled action and served upon said bank as garnishee on or about February 3, 1964. This affiant
was not a party defendant in said action and was
not a party to the judgment rendered therein.
Referring to the said deposit account this
affiant on oath says that at the time said garnishment was served upon said garnishee, the said
Ila R. Painter and this affiant were indebted to
said garnishee in an amount greater than the
amount of said deposit account and further on
oath says that the funds deposited in said account
were, at the respective times of deposit, the sole
property of this affiant and not the property of
his said wife, Ila R. Painter. 'I1he said Ila R.
Painter died the 12th day of February 1966 and
whatever right or title she had in said joint tenancy account was thereby terminated, and this
affiant, by right of survivorship, succeeded to sole
ownership of said account, subject only to the
right of said bank to offset said account against
indebtedness owing by affiant to it.
4

This affidavit is made in support of a motion to be made to the above entitled court for
release and discharge of said writ of garnishment
issued in the above entitled action and served upon
said bank as garnishee."
s/ Fred L. Painter"
The motion for leave to intervene was granted (R.
44) and the matter was heard September 15, 1967. (R. 45)
Plaintiff filed no counter-affidavit and offered no evidence to rebut the intervener's affidavit. (R. 45 and R.
58) Also no evidence was offered of any joint signature
card or joint tenancy agreement. The court made and
filed its Memorandum Decision (R. 45) reciting as follows:
"The matter was fully argued by all parties
involved, taken under advisement by the Court,
and the Court now being fully advised in the premises finds that said garnishment should be released, particularly in view of the fact that no
counter - affidavits were filed controverting the
affidavit of Fred L. Painter which appears to
the Court, by clear and convincing evidence that
he was, at the time of said garnishment, the real
owner of said joint bank account, and the Court
further finds that the intervener is entitled to
interest on said account, together with attorney
fees in he sum of $250.00."
The Court on September 19, 1967 made and entered
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 57-59)
which among other things recited that testimony was
offered on the part of the intervener; that no testimony
was offered on the part of the plaintiff or the garnishee;
that the matter was argued and submitted; also:
"The Court finds from the affidavit of the
intervener and from the evidence presented herein
5

that said intervener was not a party d<>f endant in
the above entitled action; that lla R. Painter ib
now deceased; that tlH' funds dvposited in said
joint bank account were at the fone of deposit the
sole property of said intenener and not the property of his wife, Ila R. Painter; that ::;aid intervener was at the time of service of said writ of
garnishment on said garnishee the true owner of
said joint bank account; that by reason of service
of said writ of garnishment t·mid intervener has
been continuously depriv<>d of mw of funds constituting said joint account.
"That the intervener has made numerous demands upon the plaintiff, Beehive Stak Bank,
for release of said funds but such demands have
been wrongfully refused and said plaintiff continues to refuse to release said writ or said funds.
That the intervener has been compelled to employ
an attorney to institute these proceedings to procure release of said funds from the claim of the
plaintiff. That $250.00 is a reasonable sum to be
allowed the intervener for services of his attorney
herein."
Judgment in Garnishment Proceeding:s wa:s signed
and entered September 19, 1967, (R 50) in accordance
with the Findings and Conclusions of the Court.
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law (R. 4G-49) which motion was
denied by the court. (R. 5G) Notice of Appeal was filed
by plaintiff October 19, 19G7. (H. GG-G7)

Record on

Appeal vrns filed November 2S, 19G7. No Reporter's
Transcript of Evidence or com·t proceedings has been
filed.
6

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER
COURT ARE SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT AND
UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE.

Respondent intervener submits that no logical or
legal basis exists to justify a reversal of the trial court's
decision. The answer of the garnishee (R. 35) shows that
the intervener claimed to be sole owner of funds deposited
in the joint account; also that both the intervener and
hjs wife, Ila R. Painter, were indebted to the garnishee
at the time of service of the garnishment in an amount
exceeding the then balance of the account. That answer
was not controverted.
The affidavit filed by intervener in support of his
motion for release of the garnishment, likewise recited
that all funds deposited in the joint account were his
individual funds; also that he and his wife, Ila, were
indebted to the garnishee at the time of the service of
the garnishment in an amount greater than the balance
in the joint account. The account in question was a
checking account in the total sum at time of the writ
of $723.79. It was used for convenience of the parties
in paying household expenses and replenished from time
to time by the intervener. It is idle for plaintiff to argue
as it does on page 11 of its brief that there is a presumption of ownership in each of the joint tenants of a bank
account and that:
"Respondent has not introduced a scintilla of
competent evidence to overcome this presumption."
7

An answer of a garnishee which is not denied or
rebutted should be taken as admitted. And an affidavit
filed in support of a motion, when not controverted or
rebutted by evidence, obviously justifies a finding of
the truth of its allegations.
Rule 43 ( e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
( e) Evidence on Motions. \Vhen a motion is
based on facts not appearing of record the court
may hear the matter on affidavits presented by
the respective parties, but the court may direct
that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral
testimony."
In this case the court stated in its Memorandum Decision
(R. 45) that it found by clear and convincing evidence
that the intervener was at the time of the garnishment
the owner of the joint account. The plaintiff has not
seen fit to file any reporter's transcript of the evidence
at the hearing on the intervener's motion, or any of the
other proceedings in the case, and is therefore not in
a position to attack the court's findings.
POINT II
A JOINT BANK ACCOUNT IS NOT SUBJECT TO
GARNISHMENT UNDER A JUDGMENT AGAINST
ONE OF THE JOINT OWNERS EXCEPT TO THE
EXTENT OF THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR'S INTEREST, AND. ANY PRESUMPTION OF OWNERSHIP
OF AN INTEREST IN THE ACCOUNT IS REBUTTABLE.

It is obvious from plaintiff's brief that counsel bases
his appeal for reversal upon the theory that where a bank
account stands in the names of two persons jointly there
is a presumrition of ownership in eaeh of them and that
8

by reason of this presumption a garnishment under a
judgment against one is binding not only to the extent
of that party's contribution to or interest in the fund but
against the entire account to the extent of the judgment
debt.
Counsel quotes from and relies upon the cases of
Neill V. Royce, 101Utah181, 120 Pac. 2d 327 (1941) and
Tangren v. Ingalls, 12 Utah 2d 388, 367 Pac. 2d 179,

t1961).
A study of these cases discloses not only that they
do not sustain appellant's position but on the contrary
support the decision of the trial court. In each case it
vvas expressly held that the presumption upon which
plaintiff here relies is a rebuttable presumption and that
proof as to the true ownership of the funds is admissible.
And in the Tangren case it was held that even after the
death of one of the joint tenants, the presumption of
ownership in the surviving joint tenant may be overcome
by clear and convincing evidence. The headnote in that
case recites:
"Courts are liberal in permitting proof as to
true ownership of funds held in joint savings account."
It is noteworthy that in each of these cases the opinion quotes with approval Chief .Justice Cardozo in the
case of Moskowitz vs. Marrow, 251 N.Y. 380, 167 N.E.
506, 66 A.L.R. 870:

"The plain implication is that as between the
depositors themselves, the form of the deposit
gives rise to a presumption and nothing more."
9

In the case at bar it should be kept in mind that
there was no proof of a signature card or written agreement covering the joint account. In Neill v. Royce and
Tangren v. Ingalls the depositors had signed a joint
tenancy signature card supplied by the bank. In spite
of the terms of such agreement it was held that proof
was admissible to show the true intent of the depositors
and the true ownership of the funds.
POINT III.
UTAH CASE LAW ESTABLISHES THAT EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW INTENTION OF
THE PARTIES AND THE TRUE OWNERSHIP OF
FUNDS IN A JOINT BANK ACCOUNT.

An excellent and exhaustive review of Utah cases
relating to joint bank accounts is found in 8 Utah Law
Review, No. 1, pages 57-69. The review discusses and
analyzes Utah cases - also other cases cited and relied
upon by appellant herein - and convincingly shows that
Utah case law does not sustain appellant's postion, but
on the contrary upholds the trial court's decision.
On page 7 of appellant's brief counsel refers to the
Utah Law Review article mentioned, and quotes a portion of one paragraph from the article - but stops short
of the more relevant portions immediately following,
which read as follows:
"Because the problem of proof is different
when a creditor is concerned, it may be justifiable
to presume that the debtor owns one-half the
account and to permit evidence to be adduced in
rebutting the presumption as to what the actual
ownership of the parties to the account was. This
rule wasadopted by the Utah Court in Neill v.
Royce.
10

Other courts have taken the position that a
creditor may reach only that part of the fund
actually contributed by the debtor. This view results in problems of determining the amount of the
contributions and withdrawals. It may also be
unsatisfactory when the depositor has made a
present gift of part or the whole amount to the
debtor.
A third view, stressing the right to withdraw,
holds that the whole amount is available to the
creditor of either party. This may work an injustice if applied when the debtor is only an agent
with no present ownership in the account.
The Utah position seems essentially sound.
The burden is shifted to the parties to the account,
and the depositor may prove the extent of his
interest to avoid its garnishment by his co-owner's
creditor."
8 Utah Law Review, No. 1 at pages 65-66
Appellant cites the case of Hanks v. Hales, 17 Utah
2d 344, 411 Pac. 2d 836, which involved joint bank accounts where joint tenancy signature cards had been
signed. Counsel quotes from the case and relies upon
a statement that such instruments are endowed with a
presumption of validity which can only be overcome
by clear and convincing evidence. In that case the trial
court had found the evidence insufficient and the appellate court affirmed. In the case at bar the trial court
found from uncontroverted evidence that the intervener
was the owner of the funds deposited in the joint account
and that the judgment debtor had no interest in the funds.
In Hanks v. Hales this court said:
"Whether the required quantum of proof has
been met is for the trial court to determine. When
11

it has done so, we could rule to the contrary only
if 1all reasonable minds would so believe from the
evidence."
POINT IV
BY REASON OF THE DEATH OF THE JUDGMENT
DEBTOR, PLAINTIFF CANNOT ENFORCE ITS
JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR GARNISHMENT.

Sec. 75-9-11 of the probate code and Rule 69 (a) of
the rules of civil procedure continue in effect the provisions of the former code which were considered in the
case of Weaver v. Weaver et al, 7 Ut. 299, 26 Pac. 581,
in which it was held that the right to enforce a money
judgment by execution was extinguished with the death
of the judgment debtor and that the trial court therefore
erred in ordering execution to issue against a garnishee
to recoved upon a debt due from the deceased. The court
said:
"The plaintiff can have no greater right to
enforce her judgment against the garnishee than
she has against the judgment defendant, and when
her right t.o have execution issue was terminated
by the death of the defendant, no proceedings in
garnishment could be begun or carried on. Drake
in his work on Attachrrnmts says: 'The plaintiff's right to hold a garnishee exists only so long
as, in the suit in which the garnishment takes
place, he has a right to enforce his claim against
the defendant. When his remedy against the latter is at ·an end, so is his recourse against the
garnishee. That the latter may show that the
plaintiff's right against him has been thus terminated cannot be doubted.' Drake Attchm. (2d Ed.)
Sec. 459."
Counsel for appellant at page 14 of their brief cite
the Weaver casP but argue that the rule therein does
12

not apply in this case by reason of the fact that judgment
was obtained against Ila R. Painter and garnishment
served prior to her death. That argument was used in
the Idaho case of Rose v. Dunbar, 115 Pac. 920, and was
expressly overruled, the court saying:

"It was evidently the purpose of the Legislature in enacting Section 4475 to preclude the
issuance of an execution after the death of the
judgment debtor on a plain money judgment, and
in such case a lien acquired by attachment, or
other statutory process in aid of the collection of
the judgment, could not be enforced by execution
after the death of the judgment debtor."
POINT V.
FUNDS IN THIS JOINT BANK ACCOUNT WERE
NOT SUBJECT TO GARNISHMENT BY REASON OF
THE FACT THAT BOTH ILA R. PAINTER AND
FRED L. PAINTER WERE INDEBTED TO THE
GARNISHEE AT THE TIME OF SERVICE OF THE
WRIT IN AN AMOUNT EXCEEDING THE AMOUNT
OF THE JOINT ACCOUNT.

Rule 64 D (m) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides as follows :
"Every garnishee shall be allowed to retain
or deduct out of the property, effects or credits
of the defendant in his hands, all demands against
the plaintiff and against the defendant of which
he could have availed himself if he had not been
served as garnishee, whether the same are at the
time due or not. Such garnishee shall be liable
for the balance only after all mutual demands between himself and the plaintiff and defendant are
adjusted, not including unliquidated damages for
wrongs and injuries. The verdict or finding, if
any, and the judgment shall show against which
party any such claim is allowed, and the amount
thereof.
13

The answer of the garnishee (R. 36) and the affidavit of the intervener (R. 42) each recite that at time
of service of the garnishment both Ila R. Painter and
Fred L. Painter were indebted to the garnishee in an
amount greater than the amount of the joint bank account.
There was no contrary evidence.
POINT VI.
INTERVENER IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY FEES, INCLUDING ATTORNEY FEES
ON APPEAL, BY REASON OF PLAINTIFF'S CONTINUING REFUSAL TO RELEASE THE WRONGFUL GARNISHMENT . .

"In an action for wrongful garnishment which
is not malicious, the measure of damages is the
actual injury sustained under the general rules
barring remote or speculative consequences. Interest and attorney's fees may be allowed. . . . In
the absence of loss or deterioration of the property garnished, the value of its use during the
period of detention, together with the necessary
expenses of regaining possession, constitutes a
fair measure of damages. Where the garnishment
was of money or notes, legal interest during the
period of detention constitutes the value of its
use which may be recovered as damages~"
38 C.J .S. 612 Sec. 313 b.
Adair v. James M. Peterson Bank 61 Utah
159, 211 Pac. 683 St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v.
Love, 57 Utah 450, 195 Pac. 305 28 C.J. 544.
"Attorney fees necessarily expended by the
garnishee or claimant by reason of the wrongful
garnishment may be recovered as damages."
38 C.J.S~ 613, n. 85
14

Oklahoma State Bank v. Reed, 288 Pac. 281,
283, 143 Okla. 131, 85 ALR 635.
"Exemplary or punitive damages are recoverable where thegarnishment was not only wrongful but malicious or vexatious."
38 C.J.S. 613, n. 87
In this case the trial court found (R. 59)
"That the intervener has made numerous demands upon the plaintiff, Beehive State Bank, for
release of said funds but such demands have been
wrongfully refused and said plaintiff continues to
refuse to release said writ or said funds. That the
intervener has been compelled to employ an attorney to institute these proceedings to procure release of said funds."
From these findings it is clear that the intervener
is entitled at least to compensatory damages, including
interest and 'attorney fees, and attorney fees on appeal.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion the respondent intervener submits that
the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed and
that respondent should have his costs, including attorney
fee on appeal.
WILLL.HOYT
31 South Main St.,
Nephi, Utah, 84648
.Attorney for Respondent
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